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ABSTRACT

During World War II, the Congress o f Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the
American Federation o f Labor (AFL) fought a bitter jurisdictional dispute at Basic
Magnesium, Incorporated (BMI), a defense plant in southern Nevada. While the CIO
concentrated on organizing African-American workers, the AFL colluded with plant
managers and conservative politicians, including Senator Patrick A. McCarran, in an effort
to destroy the industrial union. Following the CIO’s victory in a representation election
sponsored by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the AFL and its allies used the
newly-enacted Frey Amendment, a piece o f legislation which sharply limited the Board’s
authority to hear certain cases, to deny the CIO bargaining rights at Basic Magnesium.
The neutralization o f the NLRB also rendered the Fair Employment Practices Commission
and the National War Labor Board powerless, thus revealing the weakness o f the national
broker state when confronted with determined local resistance.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On a cold Sunday afternoon in December 1943, Ishmael P. Flory stood before a
congregation of African-American workers at the Church o f God in Christ on Las Vegas's
Westside and began preaching the gospel of industrial unionism. The men and women in
attendance, most o f them employees of Basic Magnesium, Incorporated (BMI), a
sprawling defense plant southeast o f the city, had gathered to hear his appeal for support
in an upcoming strike vote that would decide the future o f organized labor in southern
Nevada.1
BMPs construction had attracted thousands o f new workers to the Las Vegas
valley since 1941, including a large number of southern blacks. Most of these AfricanAmerican workers supported the International Union o f Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers
(IUMMSW), a left-led union affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO). With their backing, the CIO had survived fifteen grueling months o f jurisdictional
warfare at Basic Magnesium with the American Federation o f Labor (AFL) and its allies in
management, politics, and the media. Despite the implementation of segregationist
policies, policies subsequently investigated by the Fair Employment Practices Commission
(FEPC), IUMMSW Local 629 had managed to maintain the racial solidarity forged by
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CIO organizers and the black Westside community.
Even as Flory spoke, E. E. Ward, the embattled president o f Local 629, worked
tirelessly in his room at the Biltmore Hotel in Las Vegas directing the strike vote
campaign. Ward and his CIO comrades bitterly recalled their overwhelming victory over
the AFL just eight months earlier in an election overseen by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). They had seen firsthand how legislative sabotage of the NLRB could
effectively nullify a legal and democratic union election. Short o f illegal wildcat action,
their only remaining hope was a remedial order from the National War Labor Board
(NWLB). To their dismay, however, political entanglements surrounding labor relations
at BMI would keep the board from acting unless the CIO threatened a walkout. With
heavy hearts, the union had called for a strike vote.
Polls opened to four thousand eligible workers on 22 December 1943. At 9:30
P.M., NLRB agent Russell Miller emerged from the counting room to announce that the
CIO gambit had failed. Seventeen hundred workers had rejected the strike authorization,
while only twelve hundred had supported it. With their final ace played, the CIO could
only hope that a reluctant National War Labor Board would reconsider its position and
rescue the desperate union.2

The outbreak of war in Europe in the fall of 1939 set in motion economic and
social forces that would rapidly transform the American West. The rise of a vast militaryindustrial complex in the region brought to an end the colonial economy that had shaped
western life for a century. Mass internal migrations soon recast the composition and
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complexion of the urban West as large numbers o f African-Americans left the South in
search o f wartime employment. These forces would converge on southern Nevada soon
after American entry into the war in December 1941, thrusting the sleepy backwater
region into an unsettling and uncertain future.3
Just as it did elsewhere in the West, World War II profoundly changed the social,
political, and economic structures that underpinned the lives o f valley residents. While the
economic and military impact o f the war on southern Nevada has been well documented,
the social history o f the period remains largely unexplored, particularly in the case of the
growing working class and its institutions. The arrival of the new industrial complex at
Basic Magnesium brought with it social dislocations and demographic shifts that
profoundly affected the process o f unionization in southern Nevada, the racial composition
and distribution o f the work force, and the relationship between politicians, labor leaders,
and business elites. From initial construction in 1941 through the cessation o f operations
in 1944, Basic Magnesium and its warring unions challenged the principle o f federal
involvement in labor relations and tested the limits o f workplace democracy.
This study seeks to reveal the hidden history of these developments and to assess
their consequences for workers in southern Nevada and throughout the nation. As in any
social history, breadth o f coverage is sometimes sacrificed so that otherwise invisible
social, political, and economic ties among key actors can be more deeply explored.
Strictly speaking, however, this study falls under the rubric of the “old” labor history.
While appropriate attention is devoted to the lives of laborers outside the workplace, the
Basic Magnesium labor war primarily involved relations between, and transformations
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within, competing institutions. In a sense, this conflict requires the historian to operate at
the intersection o f the old and the new labor histories, examining the interplay between
social change, specific social groups, and the institutions through which their collective
aspirations were expressed.
Broker state theory provides the lens through which events at Basic Magnesium
can best be viewed and understood. Although Western historians currently find
themselves divided on a multitude o f issues, almost all agree on one distinctive
characteristic o f the American West: the pivotal role of federal bureaucratic agencies in
structuring and mediating conflict among competing social groups. Most also agree that
the expansion o f the state and its administrative apparatus during the New Deal years and
World War II vastly increased Washington's impact on such struggles and the region at
large.4 This model o f federal intervention in the West corresponds directly to the "broker
state" paradigm advanced mainly by neo-Marxist scholars.5
As labor historians have long recognized, the broker state hypothesis best explains
the ability o f President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration to preserve social solidarity
while providing competing political forces with an arena for conflict. Under this model, a
relatively autonomous state serves as an organizing force that unifies a divided and
provincial capitalist class. The state itself is not monolithic, however; it is "the product of
class conflict in the larger society, mediated through a complex network o f state agencies
that are themselves the loci of class and interest group conflict."6 Thus, federal agencies
such as the National Labor Relations Board, the National War Labor Board, and the Fair
Employment Practices Commission served to regulate class conflict even as they
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ultimately reinforced corporate values and interests.
The power of labor agencies in the broker state rested ultimately on the National
Labor Relations Act o f 1935 (popularly known as the Wagner Act). One o f the legislative
centerpieces o f Roosevelt's “second” New Deal, the law required employers to recognize
and bargain with a union chosen by a majority of their workers, thus giving official
sanction to the principle of union organization and workplace democracy. After 1941,
wartime necessities forced Roosevelt to create two more federal labor agencies, the
National War Labor Board and the Fair Employment Practices Commission, largely
because labor’s no-strike pledge (NSP) tempted political conservatives and business
leaders to attempt a rollback of the gains made by unions during the 1930s. It necessarily
became the responsibility o f the federal government to protect a "de-fanged" labor
movement.7
O f the three federal agencies charged with protecting democratic principles in the
workplace, the National Labor Relations Board played the key role. According to
historian Fred Witney, the Wagner Act and the NLRB rested on "four basic principles":
the encouragement of the practice and procedures o f collective bargaining, the protection
o f employees in their right to self-organization, the requirement of employers to bargain
collectively with majority-designated unions, and the right of majority unions to represent
all workers in the bargaining unit, members and non-members alike. As the enforcer of
these principles, the National Labor Relations Board was "charged with the responsibility
o f making meaningful the right of employees to self-organization and collective
bargaining."8
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By comparison, the National War Labor Board possessed only limited authority,
namely that of adjudicating serious and seemingly unresolvable disputes in war production
industries. Technically, the NWLB could not invade the jurisdictional territory o f the
NLRB, nor could it render decisions that conflicted with NLRB policies or Wagner Act
provisions. In practice, however, the NWLB often assumed jurisdiction over those
disputes that threatened defense production, even when such conflicts would normally fall
under NLRB auspices. The National War Labor Board generally followed a policy of
intervening only when Wagner Act procedures had been exhausted. While refusing to
become involved in representation matters, the Board often ordered employers to bargain
with NLRB-certified agents and to comply with the Wagner Act.9
The Fair Employment Practices Commission, whose authority stemmed from
Executive Orders issued in 1941 and 1943, had a broad mandate to abolish discriminatory
practices by employers engaged in defense production. The FEPC thus held jurisdiction
over the entire military-industrial complex. Despite this tremendous responsibility, neither
Congress nor the President provided the Commission with any means for enforcing its
orders. Accordingly, the FEPC turned to other federal agencies like the NLRB and
NWLB to enforce the national policy of nondiscrimination. When these agencies failed,
the Fair Employment Practices Commission had little power save that o f moral persuasion.
As Robert Zieger notes, the "FEPC proved a frail reed upon which to base the hopes of
black workers."10
World War II rapidly expanded the role o f these federal agencies and the functions
of the broker state in general, particularly in the West. The massive and sudden growth of
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defense industries in the region and the accompanying demographic dislocations also
provoked new battles between capital and labor and intensified the bitter internecine feud
between the AFL and the CIO. Their civil war had split the organized labor movement in
the United States since 1935, when the CIO and its policy o f industrial unionism had
emerged to threaten the craft-based hegemony enjoyed by the AFL since the late
nineteenth century.11
These ideological and organizational conflicts had subsided briefly in the
immediate aftermath o f Pearl Harbor, when unbridled patriotic sentiment moved AFL and
CIO leaders to adopt a no-strike pledge for the duration o f the war. By January 1942, the
AFL’s governing body in southern Nevada, the Clark County Central Labor Council
(CCCLC), had ratified the national no-strike pledge and entered into a similar agreement
with the Las Vegas Association of Employers in exchange for guarantees that anti-union
activities would likewise be suspended. Ostensibly meant to guarantee labor peace, public
goodwill, and uninterrupted defense production, the NSP could also be used against
workers. By removing labor’s most powerful weapon—the strike—the NSP invited
employers to be more aggressive without fear o f retaliation. Moreover, if unions lacked
the power to enforce their demands, what incentives did workers have to join? Ironically,
many workers who supported the NSP in theory found it a handicap in reality when their
own unions could not pursue legitimate grievances. On many occasions, workers were
surprised to find their unions used as a tool to discipline militant members who went on
strike in violation o f labor’s pledge.12
Other factors made the NSP particularly relevant for BMI workers. First, the no-

strike pledge received its most substantial and unqualified support from unions with strong
leftist or Communist leanings. Thus, pro-Soviet unionists like Reid Robinson, president of
the IUMMSW, often “willingly, even cheerfully, ran the risk o f endorsing policies and
practices normally associated with odious forms o f worker discipline and exploitation.”13
Moreover, the NSP and the patriotic sentiments it stirred carried far greater weight for
workers in defense plants than it did in other establishments.14 Thus, Local 629 found
itself hamstrung by the NSP itself, the policies o f its own union leadership, and the setting
in which it operated. Seen in this light, the CIO’s decision to resort to the strike vote in
December 1943 reveals the level o f desperation that the union had reached, as well as the
seriousness with which it regarded a possible defeat.
Despite the adoption o f the NSP, the outbreak o f war intensified the conflict
between the AFL and CIO as the conversion to defense production brought an
unprecedented number o f new recruits into the industrial work force. Many o f these
novice workers were employed in defense plants that had appeared virtually overnight,
plants like Basic Magnesium.15 Federal agencies increasingly operated at the nodes of
these industrial conflicts, using wartime pressures for political and social order to diffuse
class and racial tensions and to channel militant behavior. It is no accident that the most
serious challenges to this expanding broker state arose in the West, a region dramatically
transformed by wartime industrialization, and historically bound by complex and often
contradictory ties to Washington. As the Basic Magnesium labor war escalated from 1942
to 1944, the NLRB, the NWLB, and the FEPC became targets for craft unionists,
politicians, and industrial managers opposed to ClO-style unionism and New Deal labor
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liberalism. Conversely, the CIO relied heavily on these agencies for protection and
support in building its local union in southern Nevada.
More than a typical wartime jurisdiction dispute, labor's war at Basic Magnesium
came to reveal the political and structural weaknesses o f the entire broker state.
Following the CIO’s victory in an NLRB representation election in May 1943 and its
subsequent certification as bargaining agent at BMI, AFL leaders and their conservative
allies moved to cripple the enforcement powers of the National Labor Relations Board
through an amendment to its annual appropriations bill. In effect, the opponents o f the
CIO had found an indirect way to amend the seemingly impregnable Wagner Act, a goal
they had sought since 1938. Co-sponsored by Senator Patrick A. McCarran of Nevada
and Joseph P. Frey, president o f the AFL Metal Trades Department, the amendment
produced a domino effect, rendering successive levels o f the labor relations bureaucracy
impotent when faced with blatantly unfair labor practices by plant managers and the local
AFL.16
In addition to exposing deficiencies in the broker state, the union conflict at Basic
Magnesium revealed the contingent nature of class consciousness and class solidarity.
BMPs labor war pitted worker against worker and depended on cross-class collusion
between the AFL and plant managers as they labored to destroy a legitimate and legally
sanctioned CIO union. Most importantly, the AFL negotiated secret, “back-door”
agreements with BMI managers and then tried to impose these contracts on workers who
had had no voice in the selection o f a bargaining agent. Various programs of worker
control, particularly efforts to combat absenteeism, also depended on the enthusiastic
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participation o f AFL volunteers. Finally, when faced with the possibility o f a CIO victory,
craft unionists willingly participated in a program o f planned violence and intimidation
against IUMMSW organizers and supporters. At every turn, the AFL subordinated class
interests to craft prerogatives.
On a third front, the confrontation intertwined issues o f class and race as it
exposed tensions created by the wartime surge in the African-American population o f the
Las Vegas valley. Sharp differences in organizational philosophy between the competing
unions quickly determined the allegiance of black workers. While the CIO defined itself as
"a community project, which aims to benefit everyone, in the plant and out,"17 the AFL
maintained that it could only "get justice for its members," most of whom were white.18
Understandably, most blacks rallied to the CIO cause, giving the conflict a racial
dimension that invited FEPC involvement in the fall of 1943. To date, most historians
studying wartime Las Vegas have failed to connect blacks to the CIO or to the labor
dispute at Basic Magnesium.19
The success of the anti-CIO coalition is best explained by the essentially voluntarist
nature o f the broker state itself. To function effectively, its legitimacy and authority had
to be accepted—implicitly or explicitly—by capitalists, workers, and bureaucrats. As long
as all the players adhered to the rules, the broker state continued to operate with relative
efficiency. But when any of the players denied the legitimacy of the government's role, the
broker state broke down. Unlike the CIO, AFL unionists in southern Nevada operated
within a world view that combined their own voluntarist traditions with customary
western hostility toward Washington. When the authority o f the broker state threatened

its local interests, the AFL and its allies in politics and management simply denied the
legitimacy o f federal intervention. Consequently, they did not hesitate to use all available
means to undermine the foundations o f the federal labor relations bureaucracy. When the
broker state structure collapsed, the local CIO found itself buried in the rubble.
Chapter Two of this study traces the development o f Basic Magnesium from its
origins in 1936 through the end o f October 1942, when workers opposed to the AFL’s
collusive tactics invited the CIO to organize the plant’s production operatives. During this
formative period, a complex relationship developed between Nevada politicians, BMI
managers, and AFL unionists, all o f whom became dedicated to the destruction of the CIO
in southern Nevada. Chapter Three, which covers the period from November 1942 to
May 1943, examines the organizing efforts of the CIO at the plant, the reaction of the
AFL to this incursion, and the first attempts by the broker state to mediate this dispute
through an NLRB representation election. Chapter Four looks at the critical nine-month
period following the election, when AFL leaders and conservative politicians succeeded in
using legislative legerdemain and racial provocations to undermine the foundations o f the
broker state, and with it the CIO in southern Nevada.
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CHAPTER 2

FOUNDATIONS:
BASIC MAGNESIUM, NEVADA POLITICS, AND THE AFL

From 1941 to 1944, Basic Magnesium sat at the nexus o f cataclysmic change in
southern Nevada. Before the first concrete slabs had been poured in the barren desert
southeast of Las Vegas, the massive defense plant had been caught in a complex web of
economic, political, and social relationships. BMI served as the anchor for a new
industrial economy in the southern portion o f the state and attracted thousands o f new
workers who cast votes. Thus, the project invited serious attention from Nevada’s
conservative political elite, who joined forces with plant managers to insure the success o f
this unprecedented industrial initiative.
BMPs labor force also drew the attention o f rival labor federations. Prior to the
early 1940s, the craft unions o f the American Federation o f Labor had represented
virtually all organized workers in Clark County. When construction began in the fall of
1941, local AFL leaders entered into the first of several secret agreements with BMI
managers in order to preserve this hegemony. But the crafts soon found their backdoor
arrangement challenged by a new contender for the loyalty o f industrial workers—the
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, a CIO union that began
organizing at BMI in November 1942. The bitter and sometimes violent conflict between
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these unions would soon set the machinery of the broker state in motion.
The history o f the Basic Magnesium labor war begins in the early 1930s, when the
construction o f Hoover Dam spurred the rise o f a new and powerful craft union presence
in southern Nevada. Like BMI, the dam required the rapid development o f infrastructure
and the importation o f manpower. Taking advantage o f the new federal attitude toward
labor unions embodied in Section 7(a) o f the 1933 National Industrial Recovery
Act—which for the first time explicitly recognized the right o f workers to organize—AFL
representatives successfully founded a number of craft union locals in Boulder City. These
unions tested their strength in July 1935 with a two-week walkout over a grievance
involving the extension o f working hours. Although the strike eventually collapsed, it
proved that the AFL could command the loyalty o f workers and survive a confrontation
with a powerful employer.1
The organization of the Hoover Dam project trained a generation o f local AFL
leaders who would later come to prominence at Basic Magnesium. These men relied on
the protection o f federal labor laws to build their fledgling unions, just as the CIO would a
decade later. Ragnald Fyhen, an AFL firebrand and one o f the lead organizers o f the
Boulder City machinists’ local, discovered the power of this legislation when the Six
Companies, Hoover Dam’s general contractor, began terminating union employees as a
pretext for throwing them out of company housing. Fyhen and other AFL organizers
“used their knowledge and the new legal protections provided by the National Industrial
Recovery Act to frustrate company efforts to evict them.”2 More importantly, Hoover
Dam taught young craft union leaders that conservative rhetoric and cooperation with
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management could be advantageous. When a special agent o f the Six Companies charged
Fyhen with being a union organizer and brought him before hard-boiled city manager Sims
Ely, the cagey administrator asked him which union he represented, the AFL or the radical
Industrial Workers o f the World, a hated organization which had also tried to organize
dam workers. After Fyhen disclosed his affiliation, Ely advised the special agent that AFL
organizing efforts were legitimate under the new laws. While no union would ever be
embraced by Ely or his superiors, it was clear that they considered conservative craft
unionism far more palatable than radical industrial unionism.3
AFL organizers also developed lasting attitudes toward African-Americans during
these years. Hoover Dam attracted a small number o f blacks to southern Nevada, and
their experiences would lay the foundation for African-Americans who arrived in much
larger numbers in the mid-1940s. While AFL craft unions in Las Vegas worked to find
employment at the dam for local residents, they largely barred blacks from membership.
As a result, blacks would account for less than twenty o f the 5,200 workers employed at
Hoover Dam by the summer o f 1934. The 1930s also witnessed the rise o f “systematic
discrimination against blacks” by white employers and merchants. Segregation reigned in
public places, including the city and county jails, and “clear patterns o f spatial segregation”
grew increasingly evident.4
By the early 1940s, then, the AFL enjoyed complete control over organized labor
in southern Nevada, and black workers found themselves faced with familiar patterns of
discrimination. The Clark County Central Labor Council represented twenty-four craft
unions with a combined membership of over 10,000 workers, making it the single largest
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labor organization in the state’s history. Fyhen understood the powerful position that the
AFL occupied in the valley's economic and social life and noted that “the council will
continue to be a power in the development and upbuilding o f this community and in the
various civic problems arising here."5 So matters stood when Basic Magnesium came to
southern Nevada.
BMI owed its origins to the growing demand for magnesium in American defense
industries after 1940. During the previous decade, American businesses had found few
peaceful applications for the light metal, but wartime manufacturers increasingly used it in
the production o f aircraft, incendiary bombs, flares, and tracer bullets. In fact, only one
major company, Dow Chemical, had produced the metal in large quantities during the
1930s. Growing pressure for expanded production led the Defense Plant Corporation
(DPC), the agency responsible for supervising the building o f the nation’s defense
infrastructure, to the inevitable conclusion that the federal government must build its own
plants to assure sufficient supplies of this critical material.6
The American West seemed the most likely location for a large magnesium plant,
and Nevada offered several competitive advantages. In 1936, geologists working for
Basic Refractories, Incorporated (BRI) discovered large deposits o f brucite and
magnesite, the essential ores o f magnesium, in Nye County. Hoover Dam could provide
the vast amounts o f electric power necessary for a large operation, and Las Vegas served
as a railroad entrepot for the intermountain west and the Pacific coast. The outbreak o f
war soon led Howard Eells, the president o f BRI, to begin planning a way to exploit his
company’s rich ore deposits in Nevada, primarily with government aid.7
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There were, of course, numerous precedents for large-scale federal involvement in
the state’s economic and political life prior to World War II. Nevada had eagerly
participated in the Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916 (a matching-fimds program that
stimulated road and highway construction for two decades), the establishment o f a Naval
Ammunition Depot at Hawthorne, and the building o f Hoover Dam during the early
1930s. Senator Key Pittman’s Silver Purchase Act o f 1934 allocated federal dollars to
shore up Nevada’s mining industry in the darkest hours o f the Depression. Eells operated
within a long tradition o f visionary entrepreneurs seeking federal capital to develop
western resources, and the exigencies of war opened the door to federal largesse wider
than anyone could have expected.8
Diplomatic and technological considerations also played a key role in the founding
o f BMI. In January 1941, Eells learned of British and Canadian intentions to build a large
magnesium plant in Quebec under the direction o f Magnesium Elektron, Ltd. (MEL), an
English firm that had developed a successful mass production process. Following the
collapse o f the Canadian plan, Eells joined his British counterpart, Major
C. J. P. Ball, in a joint agreement to develop an American production facility. BRI would
provide the ore deposits and management skills, while MEL would contribute the
technical knowledge and a set o f blueprints for the plant. Basic Magnesium thus came
into existence on 3 April 1941, and Eels and Ball were now ready to pitch their plan to the
government.9
Defense agencies quickly gave their support to the new magnesium project. Eels
and Ball easily convinced officials at the Office o f Production Management that the plan
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was feasible, and conferences with the War Department and the Industrial Planning
Section o f the Army Air Corps went just as well. In July 1941, the DPC approved plans
for BMI’s construction. The War Department, however, informed the two magnesium
moguls that the project would have to be much larger than initially planned—three times
larger, to be exact. Moreover, the DPC asked Eells and Ball to personally assume
management o f the gigantic construction and production operation. All parties agreed to
these terms in August 1941, and detailed planning commenced. It had already been
decided that the plant would be located close to Hoover Dam, midway between Las Vegas
and Boulder City.10
Astute observers appreciated the impact that BMI would have on the economic,
social, and political structures o f southern Nevada. Prior to 1941, the state's major
industries had consisted of mining, farming, ranching, and limited tourism and gaming.
BMI represented the first step toward the development o f an industrial manufacturing
economy. To savvy insiders with their fingers on the economic pulse o f Las Vegas, the
plant "guaranteed a housing and population boom o f enormous proportions."11 They were
right. Basic Magnesium, along with several smaller military installations established
between 1940 and 1942, boosted the population o f the Las Vegas valley from 8,400 to
30,000 in just two years.12
No one appreciated this new reality more than Nevada's political elite.
Industrialization in the south meant more voters, higher revenues, and new opportunities
to forge alliances with powerful industrialists. This potential windfall mandated a heavy
investment o f political capital. Political interest in BMI's effect on the balance of power
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resulted neither from ideology nor party concerns, however. Such loyalties were at best
ambiguous in twentieth-century Nevada politics. Although New Dealers had captured
control o f the state government after 1932, both Republicans and Democrats exhibited
conservative tendencies and focused on state rather than federal issues. Machine politics
and cults o f personality determined the flow o f power in Nevada during the Age o f
Roosevelt. The small population, when combined with such intensely personal politics,
made it "much easier for an individual, a group, or a corporation to establish political or
economic primacy."13 By 1940, Senator Patrick A. McCarran had achieved that goal.
Pat McCarran’s political influence extended into virtually every aspect o f the Basic
Magnesium project, from its original development to its disposal after the war. McCarran
had won election to the Senate in 1932 by riding on Franklin D. Roosevelt's coattails, and
that victory taught him a valuable lesson about federal projects in southern Nevada and the
labor forces they attracted. The number o f votes cast in Clark County that year was three
times greater than in 1928, an increase due almost entirely to the influx of Democratic
Boulder Dam workers who provided McCarran with his critical margin of victory. Given
the thousands o f largely Democratic workers who poured into southern Nevada during
World War II to build and operate Basic Magnesium, the "implications for Nevada
politics, and for McCarran, were momentous."14
Given later developments at BMI, McCarran’s advocacy for industrial workers
early in his career seems ironic. While running for the state Assembly in 1902, he had
called for the eight hour day and the right to organize for the mine, mill, and smelter
workers that were flooding into Nevada to take advantage o f its new mining boom. In
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fact, he earned a reputation as a "dangerous radical" among Republicans and Democrats
alike when he opposed the formation o f a state police force following the infamous dispute
between the Industrial Workers o f the World and Goldfield mine owners during the winter
o f 1907 and 1908. His position probably cost him the Democratic nomination for the
House o f Representatives. Following his senatorial success in 1932, McCarran told his
daughter that "I owe my success to the masses of the people o f this state, and especially to
the laboring element; to the toilers and to the men in the mediocre walks o f life. They
were my backers."15
The senator was no liberal, however, despite his Democratic affiliation and his
dependence on the labor vote. A true western conservative and a political opportunist,
McCarran pursued an independent path in the Senate. Eschewing party loyalty, he
became a key member o f a bipartisan conservative coalition that opposed much o f Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. His independent politics earned him the admiration o f many
Nevada voters, who returned him to the Senate in 1938, 1944, and 1950.16 Every decision
McCarran made was calculated to advance his political aspirations. According to
biographer Jerome Edwards, the freshman senator "understood power and was not afraid
to use it ruthlessly and effectively,” and he “never hesitated to use patronage or political
favors to achieve his political goals."17 His shrewd planning paid off. After the death of
senior senator Key Pittman in 1940, McCarran exercised almost total control over
Nevada's Democratic machine, ushering in what one historian calls the "McCarran era in
Nevada politics."18
McCarran’s ties to the AFL in Nevada were deep and longstanding, stretching
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back to the construction o f Hoover Dam. From 1932 on, McCarran had strategically
supported unionized workers, especially “labor as represented by the American Federation
o f Labor."19 When the Boulder City Central Labor Council proposed the hanging o f a
plaque to memorialize the workmen who had died during the dam’s construction,
McCarran favored the idea (much to the displeasure o f the Six Companies), and he served
as the keynote speaker at the memorial’s dedication in May 1935. The AFL endorsed him
again in 1938, and indeed throughout the rest of his political career.20 Federation
president William Green echoed the sentiment of much o f the organization's leadership
when he reminded the Nevada State Federation o f Labor that "there is no member o f the
United States congress in either house, past or present, who has rendered the high type o f
service to labor which has been rendered by Senator McCarran."21
By contrast, McCarran’s relationship with the CIO, and especially with radical
unions like the Mine, Mill and Smelter workers, could only be characterized as hostile.
"McCarran's greatest fame and significance came as a result o f his anti-Communist views
and activities," noted one biographer.22 This translated directly into an intense dislike for
the IUMMSW and the CIO, particularly its Nevada affiliates. His hatred of the industrial
federation earned him the respect o f Norman Biltz and John Mueller, prominent
Republicans who raised large amounts of money for McCarran in 1944, using their
numerous "contacts among those Republicans who thought McCarran's defeat might mean
CIO domination in the state."23 The CIO despised the senator in equal measure. As the
BMI labor war came to a close in 1944, the CIO sought to unseat him and solicited other
candidates to run against him in the primary election. They met with some success. The
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senator's political allies were defeated that year at the Clark County Democratic
convention by anti-McCarran forces who refused to endorse his policies. At the state
convention in Reno, the Clark County delegation and delegates from the "CIO-dominated"
copper region o f White Pine County voted against a resolution commending McCarran's
performance in the Senate.24
Political involvement in the proposed magnesium project began in the spring of
1940, when Howard Eells began soliciting support from Nevada’s congressional
delegation. In a series of meetings from May to December of that year, BRI employees
intensively lobbied Senator Key Pittman and Congressman James G. Scrugham, then a
member o f the Congressional Committee on Strategic and Critical Minerals. The
appointment o f former Nevada state senator Charles B. Henderson to the chairmanship of
the DPC further ensured backing for the project at the highest federal levels. On 31 May
1941, shortly after the formation o f Basic Magnesium, Eells and Ball met with McCarran,
Scrugham, Senator Berkeley L. Bunker, and Governor James Carville in order "to
acquaint these gentlemen with the magnesium project and its significance to their State."25
McCarran’s role proved especially critical for the plant’s success. Local officials,
who were anxious to see southern Nevada established as an industrial center after several
failed attempts, formed a commission to draw up land, housing, and education plans in
anticipation of the thousands o f workers who would flood the valley should the project be
approved. McCarran took extraordinary pains to see that their plans were brought to the
attention o f the War Department and the Office of Production Management in the spring
of 1941. In June of that year, the senator personally met with President Roosevelt to
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discuss the project, and he later wrote a letter to FDR detailing the BMI proposal. His
efforts met with success, and the plant became a reality shortly thereafter. From that point
on, McCarran’s interest in Basic Magnesium never flagged, nor did his hatred o f the CIO
unions that tried to organize his pet project. As Gerald Nash explains, “McCarran always
felt a personal attachment to [BMI] and its role in stimulating the diversification of
Nevada’s economy,” believing always that the plant was “the greatest thing ever to
happen” to Nevada.26
In September 1941, construction workers began the monumental task of building
the gigantic magnesium plant. Eells and Ball had selected the McNeil Construction
Company o f Los Angeles to build BMI’s ten massive chlorine, metal, and refining units, as
well as the townsite and power facilities necessary to sustain the facility. A mile wide and
nearly two miles long, the huge complex ultimately absorbed the labor o f more than
13,000 workers during the year that it took to complete. Production o f magnesium would
commence on schedule in late August 1942, and the plant would reach full operational
capacity one year later. As predicted, BMI immediately became the "largest producer o f
metallic magnesium in the world."27
Political concerns also played a role in the in the plant’s labor relations during the
construction phase. In the fall o f 1941, Congressman James Scrugham arranged a secret
meeting between Eells, Ball, and Fyhen. The politician told Fyhen that he wanted a
guarantee from the craft unions that there would be "no work stoppage for the duration."
Unsure o f his authority in such an unusual situation, Fyhen decided to contact AFL
president William Green personally. Without hesitation, and almost certainly motivated by
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the fear o f a possible CIO incursion, Green ordered him "to guarantee the people what
they wanted and get the industry moving."28 Fyhen proceeded to negotiate an agreement
with Eells and Ball for the construction workers employed by McNeil. This meeting
established a precedent for clandestine bargaining between the AFL and plant managers
that came to govern all o f their future dealings.
Employer alliances with conservative, mostly white, AFL unions were common in
the late 1930s and 1940s, and were often seen as a stopgap measure to prevent CIO
organizing and to preserve dual labor systems based on race. In 1939, for example, the
Guggenheim-owned American Smelting and Refining Company supported the companydominated Metal Trades Council at its large smelting facility in El Paso, Texas. This
union and its white leadership supposedly represented both the small number o f white craft
workers and the mass o f Chicano workers who staffed the facility, but in reality it was
merely “an additional form o f labor control in the plant.”29
Despite their backdoor pact, the AFL-BMI relationship experienced some initial
turbulence. In the spring of 1942, the AFL protested to the Senate Special Committee
Investigating the National Defense Program (popularly known as the Truman Committee
after its irascible chairman, Senator Harry Truman of Missouri) that several management
practices had created "bottlenecks in the completion of the Basic Magnesium plant."
According to the AFL, craft union representatives could not properly confer with their
membership because management denied them access to plant property and placed
unspecified "restrictive measures" on their activities. The AFL also accused the McNeil
Construction Company of attempting to do electrical, sheet metal, and plumbing work that
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should have been assigned to Las Vegas firms, thus disrupting local labor markets and
business conditions.30
Housing the construction crews and the production workers who followed them
also proved to be a difficult problem, one that plagued BMI throughout the war. As early
as July 1941, government surveyors argued for the necessity of a town adjacent to the
plant, but local officials were reluctant to permit the building of another population center
between Las Vegas and Boulder City. Eells and the DPC also balked at financing such a
large undertaking. By December 1941, however, the growing number o f workers and the
inability of Las Vegas and Boulder City to absorb them forced the DPC to authorize
construction o f temporary housing close to the plant. Basic Townsite, which would be
renamed Henderson in 1944, quickly took shape.31 The CIO later attacked the quality of
housing at the townsite, contrasting it sharply with worker accommodations in Los
Angeles: “These [Los Angeles] housing projects are as different from the Basic housing
as night is from day. The houses are permanent construction, whereas the Basic houses
are demountable cheeseboxes, through which the desert winds howl a gale.”32
Despite these shortcomings, Basic Townsite homes were in such high demand that
new projects had to be undertaken to ease the pressure on existing facilities. In 1942, the
DPC funded the construction of Victory Village, a 300-unit complex reserved for white
workers. Carver Park, a 324-unit complex for blacks, was completed in October o f the
following year. Both contained family units, apartments, dormitories for single workers,
and recreation centers and schools (elementary schools at Basic Townsite were racially
segregated, but the high school was not). Conditions remained poor, however, and only
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under pressure from the AFL and CIO did the company install air conditioning, electrical
refrigeration, and fireproofing. Even this huge building program could not meet workers’
needs, and many new arrivals were forced to find shelter elsewhere.33
The lack o f adequate housing for African-Americans at the plant and the refusal of
Boulder City and North Las Vegas to permit black residents led to the formation of a large
black community on the Westside o f Las Vegas after 1942. During the 1930s, blacks had
been largely segregated to a two-block section downtown. When black businesses were
forced out o f the downtown area during the wartime boom o f the early 1940s, AfricanAmericans began moving in increasing numbers to the previously all-white Westside.
According to historian Michael Coray, “the area became a mix o f permanent dwellings and
crude shacks, shanties, and tents. For African-American newcomers, it provided
temporary shelter but little in the way o f sanitary and other facilities.” Nevertheless, cheap
rents and the attractions of a common community meant that most blacks would choose to
live in the Westside rather than in Carver Park.34
By the summer of 1942, the difficulties associated with recruiting and organizing
the plant's operating forces overshadowed these other problems. Although BMI retained
many McNeil construction workers as production operatives, it would take massive
numbers o f job-seeking migrants to staff the huge plant. BMI production workers came
from a variety of regional, racial, and ethnic backgrounds that challenged AFL organizers
accustomed to a more homogenous population. Special recruiters used nationwide
advertising and word-of-mouth promotion to attract applicants from every state in the
country.35
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Seeking new opportunities at BMI, African-Americans from the deep South came
to Las Vegas in record numbers. Drawn from economically depressed areas, especially
from the rural communities o f Tallulah, Louisiana, and Fordyce, Arkansas, many blacks
followed “migration chains,” in which family members and acquaintances already in
Nevada convinced those who had remained behind to join them. By the end o f the first
year o f operations, African-Americans would hold nearly sixty percent o f all production
jobs at the plant. Their impact on the racial demographics o f the Las Vegas valley was
nothing less than spectacular. In 1940, there were 181 African-Americans in Clark
County, comprising just over 1 percent of the population. By 1943, that number had
climbed to 4,200, with blacks accounting for more than 10 percent of the valley’s
residents.36
Women and Native Americans also found employment at the plant. In addition to
clerical jobs, women were assigned to the production line beginning in February 1943.
Most were housewives or former office workers who resided in Basic Townsite. None
had previous experience, and this initial placement was seen as an experiment. It proved
successful, and women remained on the production line until Basic Magnesium closed in
November 1944. From management’s point of view, their employment not only helped
ease the severe local labor shortage, but also relieved pressure on local housing by
utilizing more workers per household. Native Americans from various tribes were found
mainly in the refineries and preparation departments, where “their foremen report that they
are good, conscientious workers, with a low percentage o f absenteeism. Loyalty is a
characteristic.” The Basic Bombardier, the official plant newspaper, reported that some
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o f these Native American workers were also “men o f education.”37
N ot all BMI workers chose their fate voluntarily. Los Angeles police courts
routinely sentenced drunks and other minor offenders to paid labor at Basic Magnesium in
lieu o f thirty days in jail; many of these men served repeated terms at the plant, which
employed them in a variety o f positions, including those requiring extreme skill and care.
Agents from the company's Los Angeles employment office frequently waited outside the
court for their new charges, who were then bussed or trucked to Las Vegas to serve out
their sentences.38 CIO member M. L. Reese recounted one memorable instance o f a man
being sentenced to BMI after having just served three consecutive six-month sentences for
drunken driving:
He came out here after getting out of the last one and went on another bender and
stayed in pretty bad shape for about a week. . . . He was in a trailer camp with one
o f those large galvanized iron tubs, with a little water in it, attempting to take a
bath right in the middle of the trailer park, entirely nude, in broad daylight. . . . I
believe it was 3 days later that I seen the man, he went to work for Basic
Magnesium, working in the mechanical maintenance department, a place where
they really need somebody that knows what he is doing and on his toes.39
BMI’s practice of recruiting from the drunk tanks of Los Angeles continued even after the
company began refusing employment to blacks. “It was impossible to organize these
men," Fyhen lamented, "and we had a very bad situation develop."40
Regardless o f their background, BMI operatives encountered a complex
production process that often exposed them to dangerous chemicals, oppressive heat, and
chlorine gas. Magnesium was produced in four stages: preparation, chlorination,
electrolysis, and refining.41 The first stage consisted o f transforming raw magnesite from
the Nye County mines into small briquets, or pellets, by combining it with coal, peat, and
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sulfur dust in pre-heating equipment and rotary kilns. In the second stage, chain-driven
cars carried these pellets to one of the ten main units, each o f which contained a
chlorination department. There, the containers filled with briquets were emptied into large
electric furnaces, each thirty feet high and fifteen feet in diameter, where chlorine was
injected into the mixture. A chemical reaction took place in the furnaces, which operated
at about 900 degrees centigrade, that produced liquid magnesium chloride. Carbon
monoxide and carbon dioxide gases remained as waste products.42
In stage three, the liquid magnesium chloride flowed into a passing crucible, which
delivered the mixture into several rectangular electric cells. An electrical current was
passed through the melted substance to stimulate the formation o f liquid magnesium
globules on the surface o f the cells while the chlorine was drawn off as a gas. Workers
scooped the liquid metal off the surface o f the cell with a ladle and deposited it in another
crucible used to separate pure magnesium metal from slag remnants. This cell metal was
then cast in large, cheese-shaped molds that were allowed to solidify. In the final stage,
the molds moved to the foundry where they were remelted to remove any remaining
impurities and where alloying elements could be added if desired.43
Allegations o f poor working conditions at the plant, most o f which were accurate,
generated much controversy. In December 1943, a report by the national War Manpower
Commission (WMC) concluded that poor conditions on the production line had led to an
exceptionally high quit rate at BMI. John P. Bums, head of the Las Vegas office of the
United States Employment Service (USES), estimated that 1,200 workers had quit their
jobs in the Las Vegas area during the second half o f 1943 alone.44 The report drew fire
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from critics. Keith Hickman, the safety inspector for the Nevada Industrial Commission
and a former president o f the CCCLC, attacked the Commission’s findings as “pure
propaganda.” He attributed the high quit rate and absenteeism to “the large number of
migratory workers sent here from Los Angeles who have no intention o f staying when
they come,” and alleged that $1.5 million had been spent to correct the chlorine gas
problem that “was most disagreeable if not actually unbearable.”45 The CIO’s response to
the WMC report was more succinct: “With this description [of bad working conditions]
we heartily agree.”46
Organizing production operatives posed a serious challenge to the local AFL,
which had no experience with an industrial work force. Its previous dealings with
management suggested a solution, however. In June 1942, AFL president William Green
made Ragnald Fyhen his personal representative at Basic Magnesium. With the plant
nearing completion, Fyhen acted under this new authority and met with Eells and Ball to
propose a new collective bargaining agreement for BMI's production workers. The idea
received a cool reception, undoubtedly due to the AFL's complaints during the
construction phase. Undaunted, Fyhen decided to use fear as a bargaining tool. He
warned the managers about "revolutionary organizers" that had infiltrated the plant (a
curious assertion since the CIO's arrival was still several months in the future) and
prophesied a strike at any moment. He stressed that the AFL could not take responsibility
for any work stoppages since the project remained unorganized. His "argument," as well
as concerns over the financial and political costs of labor strife and its attendant delays,
convinced Eells and Ball to accept the AFL's offer.47
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Contract negotiations subsequently commenced in Washington, D.C., a clear
indication that both management and the AFL wanted to avoid local repercussions from
workers who might not want craft union representation. William Green thought the
negotiations important enough to meet with Howard Eels personally during the
Washington talks, as did John P. Frey, president o f the AFL Metal Trades Department.
Green then dispatched three o f his top officials to BMI to work out the details o f the
agreement.48 On 27 August 1942, shortly before production commenced, representatives
from BMI and eighteen AFL-affiliated unions announced the completion o f a new contract
for the plant’s operating forces, which Federation officials hailed as "one o f the best
agreements
. . . in the history of the west."49
With the new contract circulating to individual union leaders and the DPC for final
approval, the AFL-BM3 coalition seemed firmly in place. Once the pact was completed,
management posted signs prohibiting union organization on plant property under threat of
termination. At the same time, the AFL was permitted to open its own headquarters in the
office o f the plant protection forces and allowed to hold a meeting at BMPs cafeteria
under the protection o f company guards.50
This favoritism angered a number of workers. Only a few production operatives
had been hired by the time the AFL-BMI pact was completed, and most o f them learned
o f the agreement by reading an announcement in the local newspaper. "That was more or
less a surprise," recalled one worker. "I had never belonged to a labor union in my life. I
only knew what I had read in the papers and I thought that was kind o f bossing me
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around."51 Beyond the onerous AFL contract, recalled local CIO leader E. E. Ward, BMI
operatives resented “bad working conditions, deaths and illnesses from chlorine gas and
dust, multiple fees and dues charged by the AFL unions, rotten food and intolerable living
conditions.”52 These disgruntled workers appealed to the International Union o f Mine,
Mill and Smelter Workers, one of the ten largest unions in the CIO, for help in organizing
their own local. Following a preliminary survey o f the plant by international representative
Bill Gately, Basic Magnesium Employes Union Local 629 received its charter from the
IUMMSW in October 1942. On November 11, head organizer Robert Hollowwa arrived
in Las Vegas and opened the CIO’s campaign. The Basic Magnesium labor war had
begun.53
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CHAPTER 3

ENTER THE BROKER STATE:
THE CIO AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

From November 1942 to May 1943, CIO efforts to organize a strong industrial
union at Basic Magnesium met with determined resistance from hostile craft unionists and
plant managers. Using a well-established CIO strategy, Local 629 focused on recruiting
the large number of African-American production workers who had been ignored by the
American Federation o f Labor. At the same time that this organizing drive got underway,
Howard Eells passed control o f Basic Magnesium to the Anaconda Copper Mining
Company. When the AFL succeeded in negotiating a new back-door agreement with
Anaconda, Local 629 petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for a representation
election, the first step along a tangled path through the broker state bureaucracy.
The election campaign would turn the tide in favor o f the CIO. AFL-sponsored
violence, new forms o f collusion with management, and harassment by local government
officials convinced many workers o f the AFL’s illegitimacy. Neither a hostile local media
nor racist community leaders could slow the momentum built up by the IUMMSW. When
plant employees went to the polls on 7 May 1943, the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers
logged a solid majority over their AFL opponents. Far from ending labor strife at BMI,
however, the election campaign proved to be the opening skirmish in a much larger
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conflict that challenged the veiy foundations o f the broker state.
At the end o f October 1942, as the CIO conducted its preliminary survey o f Basic
Magnesium, the Anaconda Copper Mining Company acquired control over a majority of
BMI stock and took the reigns o f management from Howard Eells and C. J. P. Ball. A
subsidiary o f Standard Oil, Anaconda Copper had operated large mining and smelting
concerns in Montana for nearly five decades. According to chairman Cornelius F. Kelly,
the takeover had been initiated at the request o f the federal government in cooperation
with Eells and Ball, who were relieved to be out from under such a tremendous
responsibility. F. O. Case stepped in as the new general manager o f the plant, while H. G.
Satterthwaite assumed the duties o f general superintendent. A chemical engineer by
training, Case had worked for Anaconda since 1921, and he proved to be a dedicated
company man.1
The arrival o f the new management team brought a serious dilemma for the AFL.
As Chairman Kelly saw it, Anaconda’s function was “that of management without
responsibility for anything that [had] occurred prior to our taking over.”2 Thus, Case
refused to sign the AFL-BMI contract from the previous August. Not only did he refuse,
but he declared that BMI would not sign any labor agreement at all. Fyhen recognized the
potential for disaster. “I could see by our organized forces, that fall, we needed assistance
and I appealed to the International for help. They sent dozens o f organizers and some
were good and others I could tell rare tales about.”3
These organizers would find a formidable opponent in the International Union of
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.4 The IUMMSW, an organization with deep roots in
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western labor history, had been one of the founding unions o f the Congress o f Industrial
Organizations in the mid-1930s. Their predecessor, the legendary Western Federation of
Miners, had sought to organize hard rock miners throughout the intermountain west since
1893 (radical dissidents would lead a faction out o f the WFM a decade later to form the
Industrial Workers o f the World, an organization dedicated to bringing all laborers
together in “one big union”). In 1916, the Western Federation o f Miners officially became
the International Union o f Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. The new union enjoyed some
success during the First World War, but then experienced a general decline during the
1920s in the face o f a renewed employer offensive and a state-sponsored crackdown on
radical unionism.5
Following a relatively slow recovery during the turbulent labor struggles o f the
1930s, the IUMMSW found itself reinvigorated by the conversion to defense production
after 1940 and ready to build on its prior efforts to organize racially and ethnically
integrated locals. Opposition from employers, constant jurisdictional warfare with largely
white AFL craft unions, and experience in socialist or communist politics bred an activist
spirit in many IUMMSW organizers throughout the Southwest during World War II.6
Local 629 continued this tradition at Basic Magnesium, where organizers actively
recruited African-American workers while forging important links with Las Vegas's black
community.
Because blacks were often relegated to the most arduous (and hence most critical)
jobs in the BMI production process, the CIO recognized the need for biracial support if
their fledgling union was to survive. The strategy o f recruiting blacks also had a practical
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dimension—failing to organize African-Americans invited management to use them as
strikebreakers. Sensitive to the concerns o f African-American workers, Local 629
brought black organizer Frank Allen from Alabama to specialize in their recruitment. This
strategy would become increasingly important as a once largely white production work
force gave way to a rising number o f black operatives. These black workers usually found
themselves restricted to smutting and metalling jobs, tremendously hot tasks that often
exposed them to chlorine fumes. According to one estimate, African-Americans
comprised 90 percent of the smutting and metalling crews at Basic Magnesium.
Conversely, whites typically found employment as skilled craftsmen, technicians, and
office workers.7
Blacks at Basic Magnesium received lower wages for performing the same work
as whites and found skilled positions largely closed to them. Ironically, AfricanAmericans also tended to be the most stable workers, averaging a 4 percent turnover rate
as compared to 20 percent for whites. Many black workers had even purchased homes in
Las Vegas's growing Westside community with the intention o f becoming permanent
residents. Union membership followed this pattern o f occupational segregation. While
just 2 percent o f AFL unionists at the plant were black, African-Americans comprised over
80 percent o f the CIO’s membership.8
Not all blacks were CIO members or production workers. Some would even
overcome the odds and rise to skilled and supervisory positions at the plant. Woodrow
Wilson, for example, began his BMI career as a construction worker with the McNeil
Company. A mason by training and one o f the few blacks admitted to an AFL craft union,
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Wilson eventually became a foreman, and then a plant supervisor once construction was
completed. Like all blacks, however, Wilson found there were limits to advancement.
When he sought a position as superintendent o f stores at the plant after the war (when
several private contractors had taken over the BMI complex), he lost out to a white
employee on the grounds that other workers would not accept him in such position o f
authority. Ironically, Wilson then had to train the man.9
Despite occupational segregation at BMI and social segregation in the community,
there was little racial friction between rank and file workers. Blacks claimed to get along
"very fine" with whites, and workers o f both races often participated in dice games that
management found difficult to break up. Even F. O. Case later admitted that integrated
facilities at the plant had caused no friction.10 White community and union leaders did not
share this tolerant attitude, however. John F. Cahlan, editor o f the Las Vegas Everting

Review-Joumal, believed that there were "too damn many Niggers in Las Vegas."11 Local
AFL officials expressed their belief that blacks "were not clean."12 Even the state director
for the War Manpower Commission, the official responsible for job referrals to BMI,
referred to black workers as "shines."13 Such attitudes on the part o f the larger
community led many to consider Nevada the "Mississippi o f the West."14
Because o f these entrenched beliefs, the CIO encountered stiff resistance to its
organizing efforts. Management prohibited Local 629 from distributing leaflets on plant
property, even though the U. S. Army had given the union permission to do so. While
AFL business agents had total access to plant facilities, CIO organizers were forced to use
the "homes, trailers, and tents" of sympathetic workers. Plant guards and local police
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regularly harassed CIO organizers attempting to distribute leaflets outside the plant gate,
and chief organizer Robert Hollowwa was arrested three times in one day for handing out
CIO literature. The IUMMSW finally stopped distributing leaflets outside the gate once it
became apparent that local police and plant guards would not protect organizers from
physical attack.15
The local media was no less antagonistic. When Hollowwa tried to buy air time on
KENO radio, the rates quoted to him were raised by 25 percent once the station manager
learned his identity. No such difficulty confronted the AFL when it purchased fifteenminute program slots from the same station the following year. The IUMMSW mocked
the idea of a free press in southern Nevada by pointing out the failure o f the Review-

Joumal to report stories unfavorable to the AFL.16 A rival newspaper, the Las Vegas
Tribune, admitted as much when it noted that BMFs labor problems were “soft-pedaled
locally for understandable reasons.”17 Political pressure also mandated a pro-AFL posture
because, as biographer Jerome Edwards explains, the Review-Journal was “a newspaper
close to McCarran.”18 FEPC investigators argued that the paper was also a mouthpiece
for BMI management, claiming that “the company . . . seems to have considerable
influence over the policies expressed in the town’s leading newspaper.” 19
Local 629 responded to these obstacles with an innovative strategy and increased
resolve. Barred from company property, Hollowwa parked a sound truck on public land
across from the main gate and enrolled workers at shift changes. When management
attempted to intimidate interested workers by sending a photographer to take pictures of
employees gathered around the truck, the men followed Hollowwa's lead and faced the
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camera, inviting the photographer to take all the pictures he wanted.20 Attempts to
discredit the CIO naturally poured forth from the AFL, which claimed that organizers used
intimidation to coerce workers into signing pledge cards. General organizer Wesley King
argued that the CIO had “attacked” craft unionists and “forcefully ripped off [their] A. F.
of L. Buttons,” and he accused the IUMMSW of encouraging production slowdowns in
order to demonstrate its influence in the plant.21
Not rising to the bait, the IUMMSW requested a conference with management in
mid-November 1942 to discuss the labor situation at BMI. A CIO delegation led by John
Bell and E. A. Phaneuf met with plant officials and voiced their concerns regarding
employee benefits, the AFL agreement, and bargaining rights for Local 629. During the
discussion, BMPs personnel director admitted that the AFL agreement had not been
signed due to a delay in Washington. Phaneuf then asked why the CIO could not have
exclusive representation rights, and he offered to cross-check IUMMSW membership
cards against the company's payroll to prove a substantial interest among the workers.
Indeed, Bell insisted that the Wagner Act had been violated because the company had
negotiated a closed-shop agreement without holding an election. These requests and
allegations were denied by the management committee, which declared that the AFL
agreement, signed or not, prohibited the company from negotiating with the CIO.22
A flurry of correspondence followed this meeting. On 22 November, Hollowwa
wrote to Case requesting another conference. He failed to reply. On the following day,
another IUMMSW official wrote to Case, informing him that there was "a very substantial
[CIO] membership . . . at Basic Magnesium" and urging management to "retain a complete
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neutrality" until the labor dispute was legally resolved. IUMMSW president Reid
Robinson then wrote to Case personally and urged him to comply with the Wagner Act by
holding an election to determine the appropriate bargaining agent. On 30 November,
Hollowwa wrote to Case again and requested that he recognize the CIO's right to
represent its members in grievance proceedings. He warned that a failure to comply with
this request would compel the CIO "to proceed under law to obtain such recognition."23
At this point, in early December 1942, a new conflict in the plant distracted the
CIO from its organizing efforts. With no notice or negotiation, management implemented
a back-to-back work week under which workers would have the first and last day o f each
two-week work period off, thus permitting twelve continuous days on the job without
double-time pay for the seventh consecutive day. The CIO adamantly opposed the plan,
claiming that it violated an executive order regulating hours o f work and overtime
compensation in defense industries. Nonetheless, Hollowwa halted several small work
stoppages and ultimately prevented a major walkout by angry workers. "We are
production soldiers," the CIO reminded its members, "and must not permit anything to
hamper production in this vital defense plant."24 Despite widespread opposition and a
furious lobbying effort by the CIO, the back-to-back work week was subsequently
adopted as official policy by the government, and remained in effect at BMI.25
While the back-to-back controversy occupied the CIO, Ragnald Fyhen and the
AFL decided to use political pressure to force Anaconda to recognize the August
contract. Fyhen had learned that Charles B. Henderson, a former Nevada state senator
who now headed the Defense Plant Corporation, was planning to attend a cocktail party at
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the nearby Hidden Wells Ranch. The crafty AFL leader decided to crash the party and
plead the Federation’s case personally. Henderson, a man certainly aware o f the larger
political context surrounding labor relations at the plant, received Fyhen warmly and
assured him that "there are ways we can work."26 "I knew the battle was over," Fyhen
recalled, "because Mr. Henderson wrote all the checks . . . for the Basic Magnesium
Project."27
Fyhen was right, and Henderson followed through on his promise. Following
several meetings between Case and local AFL leaders, a conference was called in
Washington, D.C., to hammer out a new contract. In negotiations between Anaconda
officials and John P. Frey and Joseph McDonagh o f the Metal Trades Department, the
company agreed to recognize the August pact “with a few minor changes.”28 In the midst
of these secret negotiations, Hollowwa again wrote to Case requesting a reply to the
CIO's November correspondence. On 21 December, Case replied to Hollowwa in a letter
backdated 10 December stating that any individual employee could present a grievance,
but that any request for recognition beyond that would not be observed because the CIO
had not been designated as the bargaining agent by a majority o f BMI employees.29
Such restrictions apparently did not apply to the AFL. On 16 December 1942,
Basic Magnesium and the American Federation o f Labor completed a contract for the
plant's operating forces with terms virtually the same as those contained in the original
August agreement. The new partners revealed their pact to a stunned work force on
Christmas Eve, with the AFL once again extolling the contract as the "Finest Labor
Agreement ever drawn for production workers and maintenance men in the United
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States!"30
While this may or may not have been true for craft unionists, the vast majority of
production operatives could take little comfort in the new contract. Claiming to cover all
workers in production, maintenance, and construction, the pact required every employee
hired after 5 September 1942 to join the AFL. The hated back-to-back workweek was
adopted wholesale, while shift wage differentials were prohibited. Although seniority
would govern in case o f layoffs, company judgment would be the sole criteria in the
awarding o f promotions. The AFL incorporated a no-strike, no lock-out clause in
accordance with the NSP, and also agreed not to engage in any sympathy strike or to
honor any picket line. Not surprisingly, the crafts also agreed not to involve the company
in any jurisdictional controversies. The agreement was to remain in force for the duration
of the war.31
Craft union contempt for production operatives oozed from virtually every
provision o f the contract, but was most blatant in the assignment o f wage rates. While
establishing a detailed pay scale for workers in twenty-three crafts, the contract left
operative wages completely to company discretion.32 Moreover, Ragnald Fyhen later
admitted before the Truman Committee that non-AFL employees had no access to the
contract’s grievance procedures; they were left to “handle their grievances individually.”33
The seniority clause was especially noxious. E. E. Ward, the president o f Local 629, later
lamented the impact of the clause on the lives o f BMI operatives:
The practice in the plant is to upgrade people according to who they live with,
who they know, who is friendly with who, and in many cases, to whom you are
related . . . the saying about B. M. I. is that you get your job, you keep your job
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and you are promoted or demoted and terminated, you get a house, you get
treatment at the hospital, you get this and that, in fact all o f your life as a B. M. I.
worker and your success as a B. M. I. worker depends not on what you know but
who you know.34
The CIO promptly denounced the agreement as a glorification of "dictators" and
"dictatorial tactics."35
According to The Union, the official newspaper o f the Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers, only a last-ditch effort by Hollowwa averted a strike over the terms o f the
contract. In a show o f support for Local 629, workers in five departments left the plant at
shift change wearing red, white, and blue CIO buttons, a demonstration that doubtlessly
heartened union leaders. Realizing that there was no hope of overcoming the AFL-BMI
partnership without outside assistance, the CIO turned to the federal government to insure
the right o f BMI workers to choose their own representative. On 1 January 1943, Local
629 filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board citing unfair labor practices
and requesting an election to determine the appropriate bargaining agent at BMI.36 The
machinery o f the broker state had been set in motion.
The threat o f NLRB intervention clearly unnerved the AFL, which decided to take
more direct action against the CIO. Twice in mid-February, AFL "goons" attacked
Robert Hollowwa as he distributed leaflets outside the plant. In the first attack, the sound
truck equipment was stolen and Hollowwa's life was threatened. The police refused to
take any action, an indication of BMI's influence over local authorities. In the second
assault, Hollowwa and two other organizers were again distributing leaflets when four
carloads o f men suddenly pulled up. Recognizing them as AFL hirelings, Hollowwa and
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the other organizers took refuge in his car. The gang turned the car over, smashed all the
windows, and threw rocks at the men inside while threatening to kill them. They were
stopped at the last moment when plant protection guards arrived and arrested the
assailants.37
According to Fyhen, violence was a planned strategy o f the AFL: "We had a
battle battalion o f regulars with pipewrenches and spudwrenches and all other tools which
were handy for labor wars. For weeks we had a regular battle ground outside the gate
every afternoon."38 Plant managers and local officials tacitly supported these violent
tactics. O f the fifteen AFL men involved in the second attack, only two were held for
identification. E. E. Ward would later complain that "no protection could be obtained
from the sheriff or the District Attorney."39 The District Attorney substantiated this
charge when he admitted that he was opposed to all unions (even as he conveniently failed
to distinguish between attackers and victims). He further expressed his disdain for the
safety of CIO organizers when he explained that he had failed to arrest some suspected
assailants because the attack had occurred on a holiday.40
Despite this quasi-official sanction, the AFL’s violent strategy backfired.
According to Hollowwa, more new members were signed up on the day after the first
attack than ever before. Several AFL construction workers, disgusted by the tactics of
their own leadership, stopped by the CIO table to express their support for the IUMMSW
organizing drive. A few even asked to join. Organizers used up all their buttons and
receipt books and almost all the membership cards they had on hand. IUMMSW national
officials arrived in the midst of this turmoil to demonstrate their support for Local 629.
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President Reid Robinson, executive board member Ralph Rasmussen, and organizers
James Robinson, William Gately, and Jack Marcotti stood on a leaflet line and personally
spoke with interested workers.41 “That’s how American workers react to Gestapo
methods,” remarked one CIO leader.42
This outpouring of support failed to prevent continued harassment, however. On
20 February 1943, just a few days after the AFL attacks, BMI plant protection guards
accompanied chief investigator James H. Mulgannon to the CIO’s leaflet distribution point
outside the main gate. There, they searched four automobiles, including one occupied by
Hollowwa. According to Mulgannon, the guards found a loaded pistol laying at the
organizer’s feet. They promptly arrested him on the charge of violating a Nevada statute
that prohibited convicted felons from owning or carrying a concealed weapon (Hollowwa
allegedly had a prior felony conviction in California). Both Mulgannon and another plant
protection guard recalled Hollowwa stating that the CIO “could not get protection from
the U.S. marshals, the sheriffs office or plant protection, and we have taken measures to
protect ourselves.”43
Despite flimsy evidence and CIO charges of “an old-fashioned frame-up,”
Hollowwa’s case was scheduled for trial in July, and he was released on $1,000 bail. On
day three of his trial that summer, the case took a bizarre turn when Judge George E.
Marshall declared a mistrial due to an article that had appeared in the previous day’s

Review-Joumal that named prosecution witnesses who would testify in connection with
Hollowwa’s California prison record. Moreover, the judge complained about the
circulation o f a CIO leaflet urging witnesses to come forward and calling upon supporters
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to pack the courtroom. At Hollowwa’s retrial on September 20, Judge Marshall finally
dismissed all charges against him for lack o f evidence. By that time, however, Hollowwa
had left BMI to help lead an organizing drive in California.44
Given the violence and harassment, tensions were understandably high as an
NLRB preliminary hearing began on 1 March 1943. At issue was whether the CIO had
made a legitimate demand for recognition on behalf o f a majority o f plant workers before
Anaconda had signed the December contract. The AFL continued to rely on the
agreement as a bar to an election, while management refused to take either side. Local
629 introduced the November correspondence with Case to prove that they had made the
necessary demand, and it admitted into evidence over eleven hundred membership cards as
proof o f substantial support. Upon closer examination, however, the cards revealed that
only 18 percent o f the workers in the designated bargaining unit had been CIO members at
the time the AFL contract was negotiated. Fearing this would weaken Local 629's case,
the attorney for the CIO requested that some previously excluded cards be counted; this
produced a showing of only 26 percent. The case may have ended right there, but for
reasons unknown the attorney for the AFL declined to pursue the issue. He then further
strengthened the CIO's position by stating that Local 629 had "shown a substantial
interest, sufficient to warrant an investigation by the Board and sufficient to put them on
the ballot in the event o f a direction o f election."45 This effectively ended the hearing,
although AFL officials continued their public denials o f CIO legitimacy. While their
motives remain a mystery, the craft unions may have hoped to increase their own
credibility by winning an NLRB election.
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In an effort to shore up their strength, AFL leaders extended their organizing
efforts to clerical and office workers shortly after the hearing. Basic Office Employees
Local 23090 met twice during the second half o f March 1943 at the Clark County Central
Labor Council meeting hall, located above the Frontier Club in Las Vegas. Employees
were encouraged to bring their coworkers, and no distinctions were made regarding
position or salary. The growing interunion strife led AFL organizers to appeal for
workers’ attendance “regardless o f [their] feeling for or against unionism.”46 This attempt
at industrial organization may have been part o f a strategy to use women workers as a
counterweight to the CIO’s powerful influence among blacks at the plant. At the same
time, management helped to undermine the CIO by continuing its practice o f discharging
workers who failed to join the AFL under the terms o f the December contract. These
terminations resulted in a protest from the War Manpower Commission, which told
managers not to dismiss any more workers while the NLRB case was pending. Although
John Bums of the USES assured Local 629 that management had agreed to end the
terminations, IUMMSW leaders complained that managers continued to fire recalcitrant
workers, behavior which the CIO viewed “as deliberate attempts at provocation.”47
The deepening union crisis frustrated many rank and file workers and led to
another round of violence. At the end of March 1943, disgruntled workers from both
unions staged a sit-down protest over the continuing labor difficulties. Fifty men were
later fired for walking off the job in a protest over the pro-AFL termination policy. As
these events unfolded, Federation officials prepared to substitute for striking workers, and
management used the opportunity to improve BMI’s image by speaking out on behalf of
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those workers who had supposedly tired o f the continuing union conflict. The outbreak
reached a climax when a mob o f more than two hundred workers tossed several
"suspected agitators" over the fence surrounding the plant.4®
So matters stood when hearings before the full National Labor Relations Board
began in Washington, D.C., in April 1943. The CIO had the burden o f proving that
Anaconda was aware of its request for recognition before signing the AFL contract in
December. After hearing its arguments, the Board agreed with the CIO that the
November correspondence with Case indicated a previous and bona fide demand for
recognition and found that the contract did not preclude a representation election. The
attorney for the AFL argued that any request for recognition was immaterial because the
CIO had not demonstrated either a majority or a substantial interest among the workers.
The NLRB overruled this point because the AFL counsel had acknowledged a substantial
CIO interest during the March hearing. To the AFL's dismay, the Board ordered an
election to determine the appropriate bargaining agent at Basic Magnesium.49
Violence surged once again a week after the Board issued its order. On 22 April,
AFL construction workers attacked CIO organizers and their wives who were
campaigning outside the plant gate. An injured organizer was taken to the BMI hospital,
where the hospital staff denied his request that they take a photograph o f his wounds.
Later that evening, eight men with spudwrenches attacked CIO organizer Charles
Godbold. Mrs. Lee Reese, the wife of Local 629's recording secretary, saved Godbold’s
life by pleading with the attackers and threatening to be a witness if he were killed. Angry
CIO members responded immediately to these assaults with an attack on AFL
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pamphleteers, during which a stray shotgun blast narrowly missed one Federation
organizer. Construction workers threw wrenches and other debris at the departing auto,
but failed to stop it. BMI guards were reportedly forbidden to interfere in these
disturbances in spite o f AFL threats to attack CIO leaders and to break up CIO meetings.
However, these same guards and local deputy sheriffs were encouraged to follow pro-CIO
workers and maintain surveillance on their homes.50
While failing to mention its own violent tactics, the AFL opened the long and
brutal election campaign with a half-page newspaper advertisement accusing the CIO of
"terroristic activity," "threats o f bodily harm," and "the use o f force." The Federation
clearly stated its intentions and revealed its priorities: the union would protect its
agreement with BMI, protect the membership's welfare, and protect the production of
magnesium.51 In response, the CIO accused the AFL of standing idly by as men,
"outraged by bad working conditions and intolerable living conditions," were "choking
with dust" and "dying o f [chlorine] gas."52
To prove itself as the law-abiding, patriotic, and responsible alternative to the CIO,
the AFL joined local authorities and BMI management in April 1943 to form a
“production patrol,” ostensibly to combat worker absenteeism. This patrol, known as the
“White Hats” because of its distinctive headwear, targeted local bars where workers
allegedly overindulged themselves in drink, the presumed cause o f BMI’s high absentee
rate. While police officials headed the operation, AFL stewards from virtually every craft
volunteered as patrolmen and jailers, serving from 8 P.M. to 2 A.M. on Fridays,
Saturdays, and Sundays. According to supporters, the White Hats operated under policies
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similar to those that governed military police. Organizers divided the Las Vegas valley
into three patrol zones (BMI and the surrounding townsite, the city o f Las Vegas, and the
area between them) and established a temporary jail at the plant. Three station wagons
ferried the volunteer patrolmen from tavern to tavern. They enforced the existing
prohibition against serving alcohol to inebriated men, found intoxicated workers and took
them home, and posted men at the local jail to intercept drunken BMI workers, whom the
police released into White Hat custody.53
The operation resulted in a public relations coup for the AFL. As the Las Vegas

Tribune noted, the AFL was “to be congratulated on having taken the initiative in curbing
absenteeism which has curtailed the operation o f our important local war plant.”54 Given
the intense struggle developing between the AFL and CIO, however, the operation raises
questions about AFL motives. Because the CIO was prohibited from organizing at the
plant, had organizers begun using local taverns as meeting places? Which workers were
targeted in these sweeps? While the sources are silent on these questions, the timing of
the AFL-BMI-Police alliance appears more than coincidental.
The war against absenteeism also proceeded on other fronts during the spring of
1943. In a plan jointly sponsored by the police, the War Manpower Commission, and the
AFL, a “work or fight” policy went into effect in Las Vegas late in March. Itinerants and
those without proof o f employment could be taken into custody, allowing WMC recruiters
a chance to determine their employment eligibility. The prisoner would then be given the
choice of accepting work at BMI or on the city chain gang. In an effort to combat
intoxication, the “no drinks to drunks” ordinance was strictly enforced, and a midnight
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closing order was imposed upon the taverns and resorts along the highway between BMI
and Las Vegas.”
Absenteeism was in fact a serious problem at the plant. By late March 1943, when
absentee rates reached peak proportions, BMI had five hundred fewer workers than it
needed to operate the industrial complex at full capacity. In any given week, absenteeism
could run as high as 25 percent, while the national average stood at just 6 percent. John
Bums o f the USES estimated that there were 350 unemployed men in Las Vegas capable
of working at BMI, and this would be the group targeted by the “work or fight” policy.
By the middle of April, however, even more drastic measures seemed necessary, and BMI
issued orders that a three day absence without valid excuse would result in automatic
termination.56
As managers and craft unionists tightened the noose around troublesome workers,
the CIO launched its election campaign. Trying to avoid "more bloodshed and violence,"
Local 629 decided to fight its war in the newspapers, where it outlined a twelve-point plan
to improve the workers' situation at the plant. Not forgetting the AFL's violent tactics, the
CIO accused the Federation o f using physical force to prevent Local 629 from distributing
this plan to concerned workers. The AFL countered with its own ten-point plan, charged
the CIO with "treasonable activity," and labeled the industrial union as "communistic." In
response, the CIO produced statements from government officials praising the democratic
nature o f the union and its record of no-strike activity during the war.57
The citizens of Las Vegas also seemed to be praising the efforts of the CIO. In a
municipal election, AFL-supported incumbents were overwhelmingly defeated. Las Vegas
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gamblers favored a CIO victory at BMI by two to one. Under growing pressure, BMI
management grudgingly allowed CIO wives to distribute leaflets outside the plant gates
under the protection o f a squad o f deputy sheriffs. These developments increased the
AFL's desperation. Fifty Federation members were excused from their jobs and paid to
assist the thirty organizers already on hand. On the night before the election, the AFL
staged a parade through Las Vegas to demonstrate its strength and solidarity. Still,
Ragnald Fyhen feared a total loss "due to the way we had conducted our organization's
campaign."58
This anxiety prompted more strong-arm tactics on the day o f the election. As
voting came to a close on 7 May 1943, a plant guard suggested that NLRB examiners
could tabulate the results in a nearby administration building. Upon arriving, the Board
agents and observers found forty AFL members waiting to watch the tally. By the end of
the counting, however, "all the AFL adherents had slunk from the room in silence."59 The
CIO had won by a margin of 7 percent, polling 1,122 votes to the AFL's 985.
"Democracy had prevailed," the CIO declared.60 That conclusion proved to be extremely
premature.
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CHAPTER 4

BREAKDOWN IN THE BROKER STATE:
THE FREY AMENDMENT AND THE POLITICS OF RACE

During the nine-month period from May 1943 to February 1944, the CIO
struggled to enforce the results o f the NLRB election. Craft unionists and plant managers
simultaneously formulated new strategies to prevent Local 629 from assuming power.
Their anti-CIO offensive operated on two fronts. First, the AFL utilized new federal
legislation that hobbled the enforcement authority o f the National Labor Relations Board.
Second, with the blessings o f management, AFL leaders deliberately provoked interracial
hostility to keep the IUMMSW off balance as new segregationist policies went into effect
at the plant. This combined assault ultimately proved lethal to the beleaguered CIO.
More importantly, by eliminating the power of the NLRB to enforce its order, AFL
unionists also undermined the authority o f the Fair Employment Practices Commission and
the National War Labor Board, the only other agencies that could have provided relief to
Local 629. The broker state bureaucracy subsequently collapsed under its own weight.
A flurry o f activity followed the CIO’s stunning election victory in May 1943.
Local craft union leaders considered the defeat a “big one,” and the following weeks
witnessed “stormy meetings” between Ragnald Fyhen and international representative
Wesley King, who headed the local steering committee.1 They agreed to lodge a vigorous
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protest with the Board and lamented, with great irony, that the election had failed to
provide a "democratic and equal opportunity" for the Federation. In a significant gesture
o f defiance, they militantly proclaimed the continuing validity o f the December contract
and openly questioned the authority of the NLRB, and by extension the entire broker
state:
Every resource will be used to the limit to uphold the validity o f our contract and
that until such time as it has been decided BY THOSE . .. AND ONLY THOSE
. . . WHO HAVE A RIGHT TO NULLIFY THAT CONTRACT, the A.F. of L.
will operate AS USUAL under the terms o f their contract still in force.2
King also made a promise “to Management and to friends o f Senator McCarran and
Senator Scrugham that there would be no strike or sit-down at the plant.” For its part, the
CIO announced that all employees holding paid-up AFL memberships would be allowed
to join Local 629 free o f charge for ten days following the election.3
It would be two months before the CIO received the official sanction o f the
NLRB. The delay stemmed from an investigation into six formal objections filed by the
AFL regarding allegedly improper election procedures. In his report to the full Board,
regional director Martin Wagner concluded that no substantial evidence could be found to
support the AFL’s contentions. Thus, on 15 July 1943, the NLRB followed Wagner's
recommendation and certified the CIO as "the exclusive representative . . . for the
purposes o f collective bargaining" at Basic Magnesium.4
The certification o f the CIO left the AFL divided over questions o f strategy. King
and other local leaders dispatched two delegations to Washington to plead the craft
unions’ cause before government officials, a move opposed by Fyhen as costly and time
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consuming. “I told them they were proceeding like a bunch of children,” he later recalled.
His disdain appears to have stemmed from motives more personal than professional.
Fyhen believed that he, as custodian o f the AFL’s local records and as architect o f the
BMI contract, should have been sent instead; he stubbornly refused to release any
documents unless he was appointed to present them. His petulance served the AFL well,
for it gave Fyhen time to formulate a new strategy for defeating the CIO, a strategy that
would use the institutions o f the broker state itself against the Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers. “I can beat this when all the avenues are closed on this,” Fyhen thought to
himself. “I will beat this election.”5
A legislative assault on the Wagner Act, which underpinned not only NLRB
authority but that o f the entire federal labor bureaucracy, offered the AFL a unified course
o f action. Just one week after the final certification o f the CIO, Congress had passed an
amendment to the NLRB's appropriation for fiscal year 1944 that potentially nullified the
Board's jurisdiction over the labor war at Basic Magnesium. This amendment, a provision
added to Title IV of the Labor-Federal Security Appropriations Act o f 1944, seemed
ideally suited to the AFL’s needs:
No part of the funds appropriated in this title shall be used in any way in
connection with a complaint case arising over an agreement between management
and labor which has been in existence for three months or longer without
complaint being filed: Provided, That, hereafter, notice of such agreement shall
have been posted in the plant affected for said period of three months, said notice
containing information as to the location at an accessible place o f such agreement
where said agreement shall be open for inspection by any interested person.6
This passage seemingly prohibited the Board from interfering in cases where a contract
had been in existence for over ninety days without a complaint being filed. If Fyhen was
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correct, the CIO certification would be virtually worthless, and the NLRB would be
powerless to prevent implementation of the AFL’s December contract.
The political roots o f the amendment extended deeply into Nevada and into the
highest echelons o f the AFL. Senator Pat McCarran had chaired the subcommittee
responsible for reporting out the bill, and both he and James G. Scrugham, who had won
election to the Senate in 1942, had voted for it. Moreover, the amendment's principle
sponsor had been John P. Frey, president o f the AFL Metal Trades Department and one of
the Federation representatives who had helped to negotiate the December agreement. An
outspoken critic o f the NLRB's apparent bias toward industrial unionism, Frey had once
suggested that the Wagner Act be suspended for the duration o f the war.7 In some
respects, the amendment granted his wish.
While not intentionally aimed at BMI, the amendment arose out o f a jurisdictional
dispute very similar to the one being played out in Nevada. Early in 1941, West Coast
shipping magnate Henry J. Kaiser had won a government contract to build shipyards in
Oregon and Washington. Word quickly spread that Kaiser had agreed to hire workers
without regard for union affiliation. This created a wave of excitement among laborers,
including a number o f CIO members, who were employed at nearby logging camps. Many
o f them set out for Kaiser's shipyards only to find an unpleasant surprise awaiting
them—the company had already negotiated an agreement with the Metal Trades
Department o f the AFL awarding exclusive representation to sixteen affiliated craft unions
at Kaiser’s Oregon Shipbuilding facility.8
Not surprisingly, this decision drew vigorous protests from the CIO. In what
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seemed a conciliatory move, Kaiser declared that his new yards at Vancouver and Swan
Island would be open-shop until a union election could be held. This pledge proved to be
short-lived as well. In April 1942, in response to a petition signed by a slight majority of
the three hundred workers on the payroll, Kaiser signed another closed-shop contract with
the Metal Trades Department, allegedly to avoid trouble from an independent union which
had tried to organize in Tacoma and Seattle. Within seven months, however, the Kaiser
shipyards employed more than ten thousand workers, and the AFL agreements were
drawing fire from the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers (IUMSW), a
CIO affiliate. Their grievances stemmed not only from the AFL contracts, but from the
treatment meted out to non-AFL workers. At the Oregon Shipbuilding Company, for
instance, approximately 550 workers had been discharged for failing to join the AFL,
along with 147 workers at the other Kaiser Company yards. The company also refused to
hire non-AFL workmen or those without AFL work permits.9
These practices led one discharged workman to petition the NLRB, which
consolidated his charges with those of the IUMSW and issued a formal complaint against
Kaiser in November 1942. John P. Frey, who conveniently turned a blind eye to the
questionable “organizing” practices of his own labor federation, swiftly condemned the
Board’s action as the result of “the unconscionable selfishness of some few men, aided and
abetted by a group o f bureaucrats.”10 Kaiser shared Frey’s attitude toward the labor
“bureaucrats” o f the NLRB, and he took to the offensive early in 1943 by appealing to a
federal district judge for an injunction against the pending Board hearing. When this plea
was rejected and the hearing was allowed to move forward, Harry F. Morton, the vice-
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president and general counsel for the Kaiser Companies, predicted that chaos would reign
in the shipyards, thus impeding production o f vital war materiel.11
In March 1943, similar concerns motivated Congress to order an investigation of
the shipyard dispute. John Frey’s testimony before the congressional committee clearly
revealed his antipathy toward the nation’s basic labor law: "Speaking for myself alone, I
believe it would be more advantageous to management and labor to suspend the Wagner
act for the duration o f the war. It is most unfortunate to have two federal agencies
making decisions in the labor field during the war."12
As the NLRB proceedings neared their conclusion, it became clear that Kaiser’s
AFL contracts were at risk. Moreover, Frey knew that the case could potentially reach
the Supreme Court, which raised the possibility o f a ruling against the legality of
agreements made by employers with minority unions before the expansion o f wartime
workforces. Ironically, wartime conditions and Congressional fears of defense production
slowdowns also offered Frey and his political allies the legislative opportunity they needed
to attack the hated Wagner Act. Frey, no stranger to political maneuvering, ascertained
that a new push for amendments would be received with greater enthusiasm as the threat
of labor troubles in vital defense industries loomed ever larger.13
This point was reinforced by the rising number o f labor disputes in defense plants
throughout the early months o f 1943, including the jurisdictional war at Basic Magnesium.
The numbers alarmed conservatives. Despite the NSP, more than 3,700 strikes took place
in 1943, involving some 1.98 million workers. In early summer, Frey called upon
Republican and southern Democratic Congressmen to introduce an amendment to the
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pending NLRB appropriations bill. This “rider” would sharply limit the Board’s ability to
interfere in existing contractual situations, regardless o f their legality. The CIO would
later accuse him o f "promising political blessing to those reactionary Congressmen who
voted to override President Roosevelt's veto o f the Smith-Connaly Act if they voted for
this vicious rider."14
Congressional debate over the amendment revolved around the issue o f companydominated unions, which would inadvertently receive legal protection under the proposed
legislation. In essence, management could sign a contract with a minority or companydominated union, keep it secret for three months, and then be immune from NLRB action.
While some members o f Congress were clearly concerned with the implications o f the
rider, others were less sympathetic to the possible plight o f workers forced into such
unions as those found at the Kaiser yards.15 Indeed, the CIO alleged that Senator Pat
McCarran was Frey's chief supporter, and with good reason. As McCarran explained:
It was the desire o f the Committee on Appropriations to stabilize labor
conditions for the duration o f the war. Many views have been expressed,
some laying blame on the National Labor Relations Board, and others
laying blame elsewhere. We believe that when agreements are now in
existence, regardless o f whom the agreements may favor , the agreements
should be frozen, if I may use that term, or at least stabilized, for the
duration o f the war, and not disrupted by confusion, misunderstanding,
elections, or what not [emphasis added].16
McCarran's wish for labor stability at any price was no doubt influenced by the
bitter struggle then being waged at BMI, but the senator attempted to appear non
partisan: "The Kaiser shipyard is not involved in the pending question any more than is
any other plant in the United States. The CIO is not involved, and the AFL is not
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involved. N o particular union is involved, as will be seen if Senators will read the
language o f the provision."17 His fellow senators did read the language o f the provision
and apparently found it satisfactory. On 12 July 1943, Congress passed the appropriations
bill with the Frey Amendment attached, a piece of legislation that the CIO condemned as
blatant "Sabotage" o f the Wagner Act.18
Upon passage, a defiant NLRB stated that it did not interpret the rider as covering
contracts executed with company-dominated unions, which were prohibited under the
Wagner Act. Responding to the Board’s request for further clarification on this point, the
U. S. Comptroller General ruled that the amendment did indeed protect those companydominated unions who had a contract o f at least three months standing. Similar holdings
were reached regarding employees unfairly discharged under illegal closed-shop
contracts.19 The Board acknowledged the AFL's success and the devastating effect o f the
Frey Amendment in its Eighth Annual Report, and noted that it had been forced by the
provision to terminate eleven cases in which formal hearings had been held and forty-five
cases in the informal investigation stage.20 The impact o f the Frey Amendment on the
principle o f union democracy seemed clear to the Board: “The amendment strikes at the
heart o f some o f the basic principles of the National Labor Relations Act. Under its
protection an employer and a minority union may by collusive action destroy the freedom
o f choice guaranteed employees under the Act.”21 Ragnald Fyhen and other AFL
organizers at Basic Magnesium agreed with the NLRB’s assessment. In fact, they were
counting on it.
On the night that the AFL delegation returned from Washington, Fyhen asked the
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CCCLC to send him to the Metal Trades Conference being held in San Francisco, where
he hoped to enlist Frey's personal assistance. The Council approved o f his plan, and Fyhen
opened negotiations with general manager Case, who agreed to keep the CIO out o f his
office until Fyhen returned. His support was crucial because the CIO had already
requested a meeting with plant managers. As agreed, Case stalled for time and postponed
the meeting until 22 July, long after Fyhen had won the support of John P. Frey, who
came to Las Vegas in order to work out an anti-CIO strategy with management.22
As planned, Case opened the campaign against the CIO by refusing to recognize
Local 629. When they brought several grievances to his attention, he refused to consider
them unless they were presented by individual employees. Case argued that no collective
bargaining agent would be recognized until a satisfactory settlement was reached
regarding the AFL contract. As a final insult, he once again denied the CIO the privilege
of maintaining an office on the plant grounds, and he refused to grant permission for union
meetings. The most serious rebuff came three days later, however, when the CIO sent a
contract to management for consideration and the company refused to respond. The CIO
reacted exactly as the AFL hoped it would. Local 629 filed a Refusal to Bargain charge
with the NLRB, which informed the CIO that it no longer had the authority to act because
o f the prohibition contained in the appropriations amendment. Beginning to sense the
contours o f the conspiracy around them, Local 629 turned the case over to the
Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor, which promptly certified the matter to
the National War Labor Board.23
Another facet o f the strategy worked out by Frey and Case became unmistakably
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clear to the CIO in early August 1943, when E. E. Ward received reports o f petitions
being circulated in the plant which called for the segregation o f black workers. When he
contacted Case to determine the veracity o f the rumors, the general manager denied any
knowledge of them, but admitted that he was in favor "of minimizing the points o f contact
between negroes and whites in the plant." Ward informed him that he would have to
report the matter to the appropriate government agencies, and Case told him to "go ahead
and report it to President Roosevelt."24
Instead, Ward tried to report it to Senator Harry Truman. On 19 August 1943, in
the midst o f the growing racial tensions at the plant, the CIO attempted to plead its case in
front o f Truman's special subcommittee responsible for investigating the state o f the
national defense program. Their reception was less than warm. Truman brusquely
informed the CIO delegation that it had only one hour to present its case because the
senators had a plane to catch. "We are not interested in jurisdiction," he explained. "What
we are interested in is getting magnesium."25
The CIO complained bitterly to the Committee about the systematic discrimination
against blacks at the plant. According to Ward, “Negro workers who perform identical
work as white men receive lesser payment than white men. The management has let them
know very specifically that they would have no opportunity for them to advance beyond
certain lower levels of certain classifications.”26 Interracial conflict between workers
rarely originated within the ranks. Ward noted that he had “heard o f no difficulties except
those that were caused by the management.”27 FEPC investigators later concurred, noting
that the “management o f Basic Magnesium, while denying any sort o f discrimination
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against non-white workers, seems to sanction unequal working conditions in subtle
ways.”28
Racial provocations became increasingly egregious as summer gave way to fall.
Workers in the BMI Medical Department reported to Ward that they had been instructed
to reject black applicants for even the smallest physical defect, white applicants were to be
accepted regardless o f their condition. John P. Burns o f the USES confirmed that "BMI
refused to hire any more negroes."29 Company guards became increasingly violent to
blacks for trivial violations. One black worker reported that a guard threatened to "stomp
him to death" for jumping over the side of a truck instead o f exiting through the tailgate.30
By late September 1943, Ward acknowledged that a climate o f racial hostility had finally
begun to take hold among rank and file workers.31
Each side accused the other o f fomenting the racial strife. Fyhen and the AFL
believed that the tension could be “directly attributed to the activities of the C.I.O.,
particularly their organizer, Mr. E. E. Ward, who in a desperate effort to organize . . . is
deliberately fostering, encouraging, and breeding a racial question that may develop into a
serious problem.”32 Ward, in turn, continued to place the blame on management, claiming
that the company was “definitely attempting to defeat the legitimate purposes o f the
C.I.O.,” and “to use its machine-made friction between various groups at the plant, A.F.L.
and C.I.O., and white against black, for the purpose o f those very aims.”33 Naturally, Case
blamed “Communists” in the CIO for stirring the racial pot, citing radio broadcasts by
Local 629 that accused BMI of misconduct toward black workers.34
Management provocations reached a peak in late October, when black workers
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discovered carpenters building partitions in the shower and locker facilities. When they
attempted to discover the purpose of the segregated showers, management replied that the
partitions were designed to "reduce friction" and to placate white workers who refused to
shower with blacks. The real reason became apparent when CIO workers observed AFL
stewards taking the names of white employees who opposed working with blacks. Black
workers were painfully aware o f the domino-like pattern of segregationist policies. Their
collective experiences under the Jim Crow regimes o f the South had made them especially
sensitive to the destructive potential o f BMI’s new tactics. Responding to the
changehouse partition, one black worker saw it as the first step in an escalating attack on
blacks: “Next they’ll throw a partition across the canteen, then they’ll have separate
drinking fountains, then first thing you know they’ll have separate departments for us.”35
Though the CIO cautioned its members against any work stoppage, the rank and
file had clearly reached the limits o f tolerance. On the morning o f October 20, all the
workers in Unit 3, black and white alike, staged a sit-down strike to protest the segregated
change houses. This sit-down fever quickly spread to the other predominantly black units,
creating a full-blown crisis within the plant. Case responded predictably. Plant guards
informed the protesters that management had asked for a meeting; however, upon arriving
at the meeting place, the protesters found several trucks and a squad o f plant guards
waiting for them. The guards began loading the workers onto the trucks even as another
group of black protesters arrived from Unit 7. Telling the guards that they preferred to
walk, the first group stepped off the trucks. The guards escorted all the protesting
workers to the gate and relieved them o f their badges. This subterfuge resulted in the
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termination o f almost two hundred African-American workers. In the two days following
the mass terminations, more than three hundred workers failed to report to the plant
because o f potential racial violence.36
The increasingly hostile racial climate at BMI and the mass discharge o f black
workers soon invited an investigation by the Fair Employment Practices Commission.
FEPC examiner Jack B. Burke arrived in Las Vegas on 21 October 1943. In four days of
meetings with black workers, union representatives, government officials, and plant
managers, Burke found overwhelming evidence o f racist attitudes and practices on the
part o f BMI and several state labor agencies. He also found the AFL-CIO dispute o f
paramount importance to many of those interviewed, with general manager Case's concern
bordering on the obsessive. Burke recognized both the volatility o f the situation and his
own lack o f authority in the matter. Despite the pressing need for some kind of
intervention, he could only plead lack of jurisdiction over the labor matter while urging
plant officials to reconsider their segregation policy.37 Without the enforcement powers of
the NLRB, the second pillar o f the broker state labor bureaucracy had collapsed.
The racial tensions at BMI quickly spread to the community, and the Army
declared Las Vegas "out o f bounds" to soldiers for fear o f race rioting. Under
considerable pressure to reduce the explosive friction generated by Case's affront to black
workers, government representatives convinced the company to abandon their planned
partitions. Nonetheless, the CIO was never able to gain reinstatement for the protesters,
and black workers at the plant experienced "a period of disappointment and frustration"
due to the defeat.38 It was a great victory for Case, who felt that the "damn niggers
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needed to be taught a lesson."39 Like the editor of the Review-Joumal, Case believed that
there were "too many negroes here anyway, and you might as well get rid o f some o f them
this way."40
The frustrations engendered by this race-baiting were compounded by AFL
obstinacy at the bargaining table. At a Washington conference between the two unions
and the NWLB, Board attorney Jesse Frieden proposed a compromise in which both
organizations would serve as bargaining agents at BMI. Under the terms o f the
settlement, production workers would be represented by the CIO, while maintenance
workers would fall under the aegis of the AFL. The AFL refused to even consider the
offer. The CIO now turned to its only remaining federal remedy, an order from the
National War Labor Board directing BMI management to recognize and bargain with
Local 629.41
The National War Labor Board represented in one sense a government concession
to organized labor in exchange for union pledges not to strike for the duration o f the war.
Bureaucratic methods of dispute resolution would theoretically protect workers who had
laid down their most potent weapon. Moreover, defense needs mandated an efficient
mechanism for resolving war industry conflicts. Thus, in January 1942, President
Roosevelt had created the twelve-member Board and appointed four representatives each
from business, government, and labor. This division of authority was thought to give
labor an unprecedented voice in wartime labor policy and dispute resolution.42
Like so many wartime innovations, however, the NWLB’s role proved to be much
more complex. For the federal government, the Board provided a means for preventing
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disruptive strikes in vital defense plants. But more importantly, the NWLB underpinned
federal efforts to control inflation through its mediation of wage disputes. Employers
were far less sanguine over the Board’s role. Always reluctant to relinquish control over
wages, work rules, and union recognition to government agencies, capitalists charged the
NWLB with unduly strengthening union power at the expense o f managerial prerogatives.
Board decisions increasingly alienated workers, as well. Following the NWLB’s
establishment o f the Little Steel wage rate in 1942, rank-and-file unionists more often than
not found the Board’s activities “high-handed and cumbersome.” Political realities forced
national leaders to suppress their own complaints in order to preserve the facade o f
wartime unity.43
Far from rushing to meddle in the dispute at BMI, the National War Labor Board
appeared unwilling at first to intervene due to the complex legal and political
entanglements generated by the dispute. Indeed, the Board seemed anxious to keep the
ball in the CIO’s court. According to Local 629, NWLB Chairman William H. Davis
suggested a radical solution to the impasse: a strike vote that would clarify the workers'
desires and create, in the CIO’s words, "an inescapable demand that would enable the War
Labor Board to free itself from political complications and perform its duty."44 CIO
president Philip Murray, CIO attorney Lee Pressman, IUMMSW president Reid Robinson,
and the IUMMSW executive board all endorsed the plan.45
Local 629 took Davis's advice and petitioned the NLRB for a strike vote under the
provisions o f the recently passed Smith-Connally Act. Neither the CIO nor Davis actually
believed a strike to be necessary or likely, but the threat o f a walkout would clearly
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strengthen the CIO’s bargaining position vis-a-vis the company and the NWLB. Because
the local had reaffirmed the national CIO's no-strike pledge just one month earlier, the
decision to call for a strike election was an agonizing one. It was also ironic. Rather than
a turn toward unbridled and unpatriotic militancy, as their enemies alleged, the CIO's
determination to avoid an illegal wildcat strike revealed a continuing faith in the federal
administrative remedies that had repeatedly failed them.46
The strike vote campaign proved nearly as vigorous as the spring election battle.
AFL leaders urged workers to heed the no-strike admonition issued by president William
Green. CIO officials pointed to the AFL's collaboration with management. Both unions
issued a voluminous amount of literature, took out advertising space in local newspapers,
and called mass meetings to stir up support. The Nevada State Federation of Labor and
the Clark County Central Labor Council endorsed the AFL's no-strike position in local
advertisements. After a brief attempt to appear neutral, BMI management took out
newspaper and theater advertisements stressing the validity o f the AFL contracts and
arguing that the AFL-CIO dispute properly belonged in the courts. The company also
attempted to intimidate pro-CIO voters by departing from company policy and printing an
official anti-strike statement in the Basic Bombardier, the plant's newspaper. Black
religious and community leaders supported the CIO by arranging meeting space and co
sponsoring gatherings on the Westside.47
The CIO also invoked broad ethical principles in its attempt to win support. First,
it appealed to the workers’ common class interests by labeling management as the true
adversary. “The beneficiary o f this muddle had been the company and its controlling
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corporation, Anaconda Copper. It has used the conflict to deny to both the CIO and the
AFL anything resembling bargaining rights.” Beyond class solidarity, argued the CIO,
basic democratic principles were at stake, particularly the right o f workers to choose their
own representatives. Failure to defend this right could “be used to overthrow even the
public election rights which we so dearly cherish.”48
Despite this call to arms, the strike vote proved to be a resounding failure for the
CIO. Seventeen hundred workers elected not to authorize a walkout, while only twelve
hundred sanctioned the strategy. In a significant display o f resignation and fatigue, eleven
hundred eligible workers simply failed to cast a ballot. An analysis o f the results showed
that the majority o f the “no” votes had been cast by AFL-oriented maintenance workers,
who now outnumbered production workers loyal to the CIO.49
Although the strike vote effectively ended the CIO's drive to organize BMI, it
remained for the National War Labor Board to formally seal the union's fate. On 9
February 1944, the NWLB predictably declined to take jurisdiction over the dispute.
Rather than admit to the political pressures that had clearly governed its decision, the
Board defended its ruling on the spurious legal ground that it could not do what Congress
had prohibited the National Labor Relations Board from doing. With a stroke o f the pen,
the CIO's final federal remedy had been exhausted.50 The broker state had broken down.

*

*

*

After February 1944, both the CIO and AFL witnessed the slow and agonizing
decline of their unions. The AFL closed-shop agreement was effectively nullified by the
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spring o f 1944, and no clearance was required for skilled production jobs. Still clinging to
their illusion o f victory, the Federation negotiated a paltry agreement requiring clearance
on plant transfers and promotions between AFL jurisdictions. The CIO fared even worse.
By May, Local. 629 appeared "to have little power" and had "lost its influence among
Basic Magnesium workers." Membership dwindled to less than one hundred workers.51
The decline in unionization coincided with a drastic reduction in the demand for
magnesium in early 1944. The plant finally closed in November o f that year after 807 days
of continuous operation. Parts of the BMI complex were subsequently leased to other
businesses with concerns ranging "from the production o f chlorine and caustic soda . . . to
the production o f brick, jewelry, motion pictures, and simply use o f warehouse space."52
In 1952, eight years after the closing of the plant, Senator Pat McCarran's Internal
Security Subcommittee investigated the national IUMMSW to root out "subversive"
elements. The rising tide o f the Cold War had resulted in the union's expulsion from the
CIO in 1950 for suspected Communist domination. McCarran maintained that
Communist leaders in the union had disrupted vital copper production twice during the
course o f the Korean War under the pretense o f demands for higher wages. For the
senator, the hearings were "also an attempt to settle old scores, to crush an enemy, and,
timed as it was only a month before an important election, to weaken its political
influence."53 Hunted throughout the 1950s, the IUMMSW finally lost what little strength
it had been able to maintain, and in 1967 the union disappeared altogether when it merged
with the United Steelworkers.54
The lack of progressive industrial unionism in southern Nevada produced
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consequences far beyond the shop floor. The political battle over Nevada's right-to-work
law provides a telling example. Las Vegas's Westside area, a direct product of
industrialization at Basic Magnesium, housed over 70 percent o f the state's black
population and the largest concentration of CIO members and supporters. In 1952,
Westside residents voted 9 to 1 against Nevada's right-to-work proposition. They found
themselves politically and socially isolated from other pro-union elements, however. A
progressive industrial union would have undoubtedly facilitated a more powerful political
alliance between blacks and other working-class constituencies. Right-to-work passed
handily and proved immune to subsequent attempts at repeal.55 Moreover, BMFs closure
resulted in downward mobility for many in the black community. The loss o f industrial
employment, combined with the absence o f a strong union, relegated many black men to
low paying service industry jobs in area hotels and forced many black women into private
domestic service.56
Finally, the NLRB's bitter experience with BMI and several other jurisdictional
battles during 1944 made it clear that the Frey Amendment did in fact protect companydominated unions. As a result, Congress added provisos to the amendment from 1945 to
1947 which explicitly prohibited such unions and the unfair labor practices associated with
them. After 1947, the amendment issue was rendered moot when Congress redefined
NLRB authority and union rights under the Taft-Hartley Act.
Several salient features o f the Basic Magnesium labor war emerge in retrospect.
First, it seems clear that the dispute was not essentially a racial one, but was instead an
attempt by the American Federation of Labor to thwart competition in southern Nevada.
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Second, although general manager F. O. Case accused the CIO o f being a Communist
organization attempting to incite racial disturbances, management was really anti-union,
not anti-CIO.57 This is demonstrated by Case's initial refusal to sign the August AFL
contract, by the company's neutral position at the NLRB hearing, and by the slow decline
o f both unions after the decisive defeat o f the CIO. Collaborating with the AFL helped
the company to maintain control over the craft unions while keeping both organizations
off-balance for the duration. Finally, political manipulation was unquestionably involved
at every stage, from the initial intervention o f James Scrugham on behalf o f the AFL to
McCarran's chairmanship o f the subcommittee that gutted the Wagner Act.
Beyond the implications of the dispute for Las Vegas workers and southern
Nevada generally, the BMI labor war proved how fragile the federal broker state could be
in the face o f determined resistance by local opponents. By effectively removing the
cornerstone o f Roosevelt's labor bureaucracy—the Wagner Act and the National Labor
Relations Board—anti-CIO forces produced a chain reaction that rendered the Fair
Employment Practices Commission and the National War Labor Board impotent. In
effect, they threw a wrench into the machinery o f the broker state, bringing the entire
mechanism to a standstill. For the CIO, the hard-won principle of workplace democracy
was crushed in the gears.
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